Myanmar 20250826
Mekong Memo Myanmar Weekly: Business, politics, finance, trade & legal news.
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Here is this week’s edition of the Mekong Memo for Myanmar.
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Headlines:
Junta Shuts Trade Bridge
Election Clock Running, ASEAN Visits
Generals’ Election Tag Sticks
Sanctions Gap and Delistings
New Cyber Law Jolts Business
Regime Demands Trade Boss Data
China Tightens Rare Earth Grip, Rebels Hold Mines
Wa Cut Aid Under China Pressure
MNDAA Talks Collapse in Shan
Pineapple Exports Target China
Zero‑Fee Wallets Link Thailand–Myanmar
Junta Shuts Trade Bridge
The junta has closed the No. 2 Friendship Bridge at Myawaddy, blocking a route that handles more than $120 million in monthly trade with Thailand. Officials say they want to try to reduce black-market flows that are funneling cash to resistance groups ahead of the December election. Traders say that their vehicles are being blocked and fuel costs have jumped, with the price of gasoline rising by more than half. Authorities in Naypyitaw say they are talking with Thailand about reopening, but tighter controls on cargo and customs need to be in play. Opposition groups say the move is political theater to present elections as a fix for border-town troubles that are actually self-inflicted. With the bridge shut, traders are routing goods through roughly 50 informal piers along the Thaungyin (Moei) River managed by Karen ethnic armed groups and the BGF. Local truckers say the workaround has existed for years and continues to handle Thai food and household products into Myanmar each day. About 500 trucks remain stuck on the Mae Sot side, and some cargo is being diverted across these river gates.
Read more: The Irrawaddy (Bridge closure), Firstpost (Pre-poll push), The Hindu (Trade clampdown), Karen News (River Piers)
Election Clock Running, ASEAN Visits
The election is still set to begin on December 28, 2025, with voting expected to possibly run into mid-January. A four-member ASEAN team led by Malaysia’s foreign minister will make its way to Naypyitaw on September 19 to meet the new State Security and Peace Commission and review plans against the bloc’s peace roadmap. Authorities lifted their state of emergency in July and replaced the SAC with a new commission to run the transition process. Organizers say they intend to open polls in at least 267 of 330 townships - 63 are still “under emergency.”
Read more: The Diplomat (Election setup), The Irrawaddy (ASEAN visit)
Generals’ Election Tag Sticks
Analysts call the December vote a “generals’ election,” arguing the military seeks a mandate without giving up control. The State Administration Council has been dissolved and rebranded as the State Security and Peace Commission, still led by Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who could shift into a civilian role after the vote. He faces an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for alleged crimes against humanity. Armed resistance persists across multiple fronts, and critics expect the military to retain the levers of power even after ballots are cast. Regional players, including ASEAN and China, are expected to accept the outcome.
Read more: Asia Times
Sanctions Gap and Delistings
Civil society is saying that the dissolving of the SAC and creation of the SSPC has opened a sanctions gap that lets ministries and state-owned companies sidestep restrictions. Justice For Myanmar is asking the US, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia to list the SSPC and plug the loophole, pointing to a new junta contract with DCI Group and a number of attacks since the rebrand. Separately, A US law firm is confirming that it helped delist two Myanmar nationals and a company tied to the junta from US sanctions, part of a July Treasury update that also removed an Indian associate. Activists say the delistings are a setback for accountability.
Read more: Mizzima (Loophole), The Irrawaddy (Delisting)
New Cyber Law Jolts Business
A new Cybersecurity Law took effect on July 30 as the government tries to reform data and internet rules before the election. Business groups say there are still unclear compliance demands, including controls on VPNs and how data is stored, accessed, and shared. Firms expect greater surveillance and new licensing risks that could hit online sales channels and digital marketing. The law adds another layer to an operating environment already constrained by import rules, currency controls, and connectivity disruptions. Multinationals are reviewing internal networks, vendor access, and cross-border data transfers while shifting customer support and payments to lower-risk platforms to keep services running.
Read more: Nikkei Asia
Regime Demands Trade Boss Data
The regime ordered the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) to give them detailed personal records about its leadership by August 15, including sensitive biographical, professional, and political information. Business figures say the request is a new level of intrusion into the private sector and can be used to map networks and enforce loyalty to the regime. The federation has been operating under tight oversight since the coup, but has always tried to present itself as an independent business body. Members worry about data security and risks of retaliation; some expect further meddling in internal appointments and industry associations as authorities look for more levers of control.
Read more: The Irrawaddy
China Tightens Rare Earth Grip, Rebels Hold Mines
New rare earth mines opened in Shan State in June, with backing from the UWSA adding to the hundreds of sites already feeding China’s processing hubs. China now buys more than four-fifths of Myanmar’s rare earth exports, including heavy elements used in EVs and electronics, often at prices below global benchmarks. The Quad and EU want to diversify supply, but engagement with Myanmar’s rare earth chain remains tenuous. Dependence on Myanmar exposes China to border disruptions, local pushback, and rival influence. The Kachin Independence Army took control of several rare earth sites in late 2024, which complicates China’s full-blown access to feedstocks that supply its magnet and electronics industries, but Beijing continues to keep its options open with both the KIA and the junta.
Read more: 9DashLine (China), The Economic Times (Kachin)
Wa Cut Aid Under China Pressure
The United Wa State Party announced that it would stop providing weapons, equipment, and other support to allied ethnic armed groups after a talking-to from Beijing. The statement, broadcast on Wa State TV on August 21, followed meetings with the TNLA, MNDAA, and SSPP in Panghsang. Wa leaders said continued support could result in arrests, asset freezes, or border closures. The decision hits the Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027, which has been somewhat successful in gaining control over northern Shan State. The Wa had already slowed supplies, but the public cutoff is an indication that they’re on a tighter leash from China than had previously been thought.
Read more: The Irrawaddy
MNDAA Talks Collapse in Shan
Negotiations in Lashio on August 14 between the junta and the MNDAA fell apart after the regime refused to recognize MNDAA-held territory as Shan State Special Region 1. Prior ceasefire understandings, reportedly brokered by China, had included adjustments to control and limits on airstrikes. Trust was reportedly fractured after accusations of violations, including a June airstrike. The MNDAA is working to consolidate control in areas taken during Operation 1027, and residents are unfortunately getting ready for more strife and likely displacement. Public anger over civilian casualties is building pressure on China to keep a lid on rising tensions along trade routes into Yunnan.
Read more: The Irrawaddy
Pineapple Exports Target China
Growers say they plan to ship more than 40,000 tons of pineapples in FY2025-26, getting a crop once grown mainly for local markets into export channels. Producers in Shan and Kachin States manage more than 20,000 acres. Shan state alone harvests 80,000–100,000 tons a year. Exporters are looking to sell into China first, leaning on Local GAP and organic certifications to meet buyer demands. Farms are adopting cultivation methods from China, Thailand, and Sri Lanka to improve consistency and shelf life. Hsipaw fruit is gaining interest for its quality. Cold-chain, grading, and customs access are going to be the main determining factors that will support volume through the year.
Read more: FreshPlaza
Zero‑Fee Wallets Link Thailand–Myanmar
TrueMoney Myanmar and AYA Pay have started a cross-border remittance service that lets users in Thailand send funds directly from TrueMoney Wallets to AYA Pay Wallets in Myanmar. Recipients are able to cash out without fees during the introductory launch period. The companies say that the benefits for users are faster transfers, lower costs, and better access to remittance services for the Myanmar workforce in Thailand.
Read more: Electronic Payments International
That’s it for this week… THANK YOU.
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